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WHY LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE EXISTS
IT Is CLEAR from the analysis of the data used by Hickman and
Meiselman and the evidence presented here (the historical data
going back to 1920 in the next chapter and the comparisons of
predicted and actual bill rates), that the expectations hypothesis
alone does not explain the term structure of interest rates. The ex-
istence of upward bias in the estimates of future short-term rates
suggests that at least one other variable is relevant—liquidity pref-
erence. Liquidity preference can be regarded as a force that causes
forward rates to be biased and high estimates of short-term rates. Its
effects can be measured by the difference between the mean value
of forward and expected rates; i.e., by the difference between actual
forward rates and the yields that short-term securities would have
to have for the expectations hypothesis to yield unbiased estimates
of future short-term rates. This raises the questions why does liquid-
ity preference exist and how does it affect the term structure of in.
terest rates?
Keynes, who introduced the term to economics, used liquidity
preference to describe a preference of the market, abstracting from
differences in yield, for assets that are immune to capital losses
produced by interest rate changes. If uncertainity as to the future
course of interest rates exists, then the market has a choice of taking
risks with respect to capital values, income streams, or some com-
bination of both. On balance, the evidence indicates that the
market prefers to take risks of income stream changes. That is, the
market prefers money to securities if differences in pecuniary yields
are ignored.' Consequently, equalizing yield differentials exist be-
i. Sec j. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,
NewYork,1936, pp.168 if.This view may also be found in Hicks, Value and
Capital, p. 151.Why Liquidity Preference Exists 45
tweenmoney and securities that offset differences in relative vulner-
ability to capital losses through interest rate changes. Since the risk
of capital losses attributable to holding securities is directly related
to term to maturity, security yields ought also to vary directly with
term to maturity. Just as the "interest rate" equilibrates the net re-
turn to holding money and "securities," the term structure of in-
terest rates equilibrates the net return to holding securities of vary-
ing terms to maturity and money. The shorter the term to maturity
of a security, the smaller is its vulnerability to capital loss, and
hence the greater its liquidity and the smaller the yield differential
between that security and money. Therefore, liquidity p:reference
constitutes, by implication, a theory of the term structure of inter-
est rates. It is tt theory, not of the level of interest, but of interest
differentials. Linked with risk avoidance, it implies a positively
sloped yield curve.2
Short maturities, in addition to being less vulnerable to capital
losses attributable to interest rate changes, have lower costs of con-
version to cash than long maturities. Since the cost of converting
securities to cash increases with term to maturity, the liquidity of
securities, in this specialized sense, decreases with term to maturity.
Consequently, the market ought to prefer short- to long-term secu-
rities. Like risk avoidance, transactions costs imply a rising yield
curve as a function of term to maturity. Given the existence of this
inverse relationship, is it strong enough to account for the normal
difference in yields between long- and short-term governments?
Over the three latest reference cycles, the average yield of the long-
est-term governments has been about one hundred basis points
greater than the average yield of 91-day Treasury bills.3 For three-
2Thisview of liquidity preference appears in David W. Lustier, "The Struc-
ture of Interest Rates and the Keynesian Theory of Interest," Journalof Politi-
cal Economy,April1942,p.274. He says: "Each rate of interest in the structure
of rates may be looked upon as balancing the advantages of holding cash."
Similarly, Abba 1'. Lerner in Economicsof Control, NewYork, 1944, p. 343,
says: "Competition equalizes the sumofmoney and liquidity yields." Saniuelson
regards liquidity preference as an explanation of the existence and level, not of
the interest rate, but of the differential between the yield on money and the
yields on other assets. See Paul A. Sarnuelson, Foundr'ztionsofEconomic Analysis,
Vol. 80, Harvar(l Economic Studies, Cambridge, Mass., 1947, pp. 122—124.
3 If the first postwar cycle (October 1945 to October 1949) is included in this
calculation, a greater average spread between bills and long-term governments46 Why Liquidity Preference Exists
month Treasury bills, turnaround costs (that is, the costs of getting
into and out of bills) typically are around one-sixty-fourth of I per
cent of value at maturity, or about sixteen cents.4 In contrast, cor-
responding costs for the longest of long-term governments are about
eight-thirty-seconds, or $2.50. Insofar as bills are bought at the
weekly auction and held to maturity, transactions costs for their
holders are zero. If bills are bought at auction and not held to
maturity, or if bought from a dealer and held to maturity, then
the relevant transactions costs are about eight cents. Bonds can,
of course, also be bought directly from the Treasury and held to
maturity.. However, bonds are sold by the Treasury relatively in-
frequently, and infrequently held to maturity.
The extent to which transactions costs can account for the ob-
served difference in yields on three-month bills and longer maturi-
ties is a function of the holding period. In general, the longer the
holding period, the less the relative disadvantage of longer maturi-
ties, and conversely. lEf bills and long-term bonds are compared for
a holding period of three months, and. if bills are bought at auction
and held .tomaturity and long-term bonds are bought and sold
through a dealer, then the equalizing yield differential is equivalent
to 1 per cent per year. That is, 4 per cent is the net yield to the
results. The average size of the bill-bond spread is larger for the first than for
any of the three succeeding cycles. It is excluded on the grounds that the bill rate
for most of the first postwar cycle was largely a fictitious rate. The governmen-
tal policy that stabilized the prewar term structure of interest rates led to a bill
yield that was low relative to the yield on bonds. The reduction in the size of
the bill-bond spread between the first and the succeeding postwar cycles consti-
tutes additional evidence that the reported bill rate was out of line with the
yield on long-term governments and was, in effect, a nominal rate.
4TheCommission on Money and Credit in their report, Money and Credit,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1961, p. 118, attributes the higher transactions costs
to the greater risks to dealers of trading in long-term governments. This explana-
tion implies that these costs must have been lower during the period when the
structure of interest rates was pegged. In fact, the spreads between bid and
asked prices were about half of what they are now.
Dealer operations are highly leveraged, more so than those of most banks, and
the value of government securities as collateral is inversely related to term to
maturity. The Joint Economic Committee, A Study of the Dealer Market for
Federal Government Securities, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 92, reports that dealer
margin requirements for Treasury bills are one-quarter of 1 per cent. They are
one-half of 1 per cent for certificates,1 per cent for bonds under five years,
2 per cent for bonds between five and ten years to maturity, and S per cent for
maturities over ten years.Why Liquidity Preference Exists 47
holderof long-term governments, if the yield to maturity is 5 per
cent; 3 per cent is the net yield, if the yield to maturity is 4 per
cent, This implies that an investor who calculates on an ex-
pected value basis, and who wants to invest for three months and
assumes that the yields of long-term securities will average Iper
cent more than bills, will find no difference between bills and long-
term governments. Consequently, for holding periods less than
three months, the equalizing yield spread between bills and bonds
is in excess of an annual rate of 1 per cent. For more than three
months, it is. less than 1 per cent. For six months, the equalizing
yield differential on an annual basis is one-halt' of 1 per cent, and
for one year, one-quarter of I per cent.
If one assumes transactions costs for bills of one-thirty-second,
which is a more realistic assumption, the equalizing yield differ-
ential between bills and nine- to twelve-month governments for a
three-month holding period is twelve to thirteen basis points (this
assumes a two-thirty-second turnaround cost for the longer matur-
ity). When nine- to twelve-month governments are compared with
three- to five-year governments for a one-year holding period, the
equalizing yield differential is about six basis points (this assumes
a two-thirty-second turnaround cost for the shorter, and a four-
thirty-second cost for the longer maturity).
Actual yield differentials (implied by Table 7) have exceeded the
equalizing yield differentials computed above. This suggests that
pure transactions costs do not fully account for the observed yield
differentials. However, one must be careful in making this com-
parison. During the period encompassed by Table 7, there was a
secular trend upward in yields which caused holders of long-term
securities to incur capital losses. Therefore, for the long bond-bill
comparison, it is necessary to add the assumption that the market
failed to anticipate the secular rise in rates.6
5A$2.50 transaction cost would come to $10.00 on an annual basis, hence it
would reduce the gross yield by 10/1000, or 1 per cent.
6Thisassumption is consistent with a number of other observations. It is con-
sistent with the observed difference between correlations of forward and one-year
spot rates considered for just one cycle and for the entire 1901—54 period when
a secular downward movement was followed by a secular upward movenient in
rates. It is consistent with the finding that the differential between bills and
nine- to twelve-month governments cannot be explained by transactions cost48 Why Liquidity Preference Exists
On the whole, this analysis suggests that yield differentials as a
function of term to maturity cannot be rationalized completely as
a consequence of transactions cost differences. Risk avoidance must
be introduced. Unfortunately this statement and the calculations
upon which it is based are not as straightforward as they appear.
Typically, bid and asked prices overstate spreads; most transactions
take place within this range and almost none Outside of it. This
tends to make the advantage of investing in long-term securities
somewhat better than these calculations indicate. On the other
hand, because the market for long-term governments is relatively
thinner than that for short-term governments, the price at which a
transaction takes place is more likely to be affected by its size. As a
result, more transactions in long-term governments are brokerage
transactions than is true of bills. Virtually all bills are bought and
sold for the account and risk of dealers, whereas for long-term gov-
ernments, dealers less frequently buy and sell from their own in-
ventories for their customers.7 Hence, an estimated 25 per cent of
all trading in long-term governments represents brokerage trans-
actions. From the point of view of the holders of long-term secu-
rities, this alone makes them less liquid than bills because it takes
more time to consummate a brokerage transaction than a dealer
differences alone. For this comparison, trends in rates arc virtually irrelevant.
And finally, it is consistent with the composite yield curve for 1901—54 implied
by the Durand data. The difference between the average yields of long- and
short-term securities cannot be explained by transactions Costs. Yet on balance,
the trend in interest rates for this entire period is, if anything, down.
7Thisseems to be a direct result of a thin market. Dealers that expect long-
term bond prices to [all would be willing to buy all offered for their own
account if they could either turn around and sell theni at the existing market
price or sell short another issue very similar to the issue offered. To the extent
that hedging is possible, dealers can win trading profits without incurring risks
of capital losses. Since only three or four dealers deal extensively in long-term
governments, it is not unusual to find that they all have the same price expec-
tations. If they expect a fall in prices, they are willing to buy at current prices
only what itis possible to hedge; they will buy the rest only at less than the
current price.
Bid and asked prices widen when prices are expected tofall and narrow
when they are expected to rise as a result of changes in the cost of carrying
inventories. Of course, quoted bid and asked prices often are not meaningful
iiumbers when dealers are unwilling to take positions.
Brokerage costs for a complete turnaround, a purchase and a sale, are usually
two- thirty.seconds or less. However, would-be brokerage transactions are subject
to the risk of never being consummated. They make sense when customer market
CXpcCtatiOnS differ from those of dealers.Why Liquidity Preference Exists 49
trade. Most of the time, and for most transactions, the difference
between bid and asked prices for bills and long-term bonds meas-
ures the relative costs of transactions, For large transactions, how-
ever, say over two million (which would be regarded as a small
transaction in bills), bonds are substantially less liquid than bills
when dealers expect yields to rise. Hence, bid and asked prices with
the usual spreads understate the, relative costs of trading in the
long-term bonds.8
Although ambiguities exist in the measurement of transactions
costs for long-term securities, it seems fairly clear that average yield
differentials as a function of term to maturity, if cyclical effects
upon yield differentials are ignored, are too large to be solely ex-
plained by transactions costs. Hence, the Keynesian view, that short-
term securities are preferred in order to avoid risks of capital losses,
does have a role to play in explaining observed yield differentials.
Motives other than transactions costs must be intr9duced to ex-
plain the observed yield differentials; the
r'' '
ofmoney substitutes is the same as the rationale for the holding
of money proper.
The Keynesian view of the term structure, of interest rates has
t I' I I
implicationsthat are, in a crude with observed
yielddifferentials over the cycle. This view ..does, more than imply
thatyield curves ought to rise with term to maturity. Vulnerability
:'
tocapital loss is not a linear function of term to matu1ity; it in-
creases at a decreasing' rate with increases in maturity. Hence aver-
age yields ought to rise with term to maturity at a decreasing rate.
To illustrate: an unanticipated permanent increase in short-term
rates from 3 to 6 per cent implies, for securities bearing a 3 per cent
coupon,'that (a) a perpetuity would lose half its value, (b) a bond
with a twelve-year term to maturity would fall in value by 25 per
cent, and (c) a bond with four years to maturity would fall in value
by about '10 per cent.°
8Thereis a danger of making too much of this point. It is clear that the
market for long-term governments is characterized by a larger volume of trading
than the most heavily traded corporate security, A. T. & T. bonds.
9Thispoint appears in Harry C. Sauvain, "Changing Interest Rates and the
Investment Portfolio," Journal of Finance, May 1959, pp. 235 if., and Malkiel,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1962, P. 202, theorem 3.
These authors fail to point out that the greater variance in the prices of long.50 WhyLiquidity Preference Exists
The evidence for postwar business cycles shows that average
yields rise at a decreasing rate as term to maturity increases. For
the three latest cycles, the spread between bills and nine- to twelve-
month governments is thirty basis points. This implies a rise in
the average rate, for this segment of the yield curve, of about forty-
eight basis points per year. The yield spread between nine- to
twelve-month governments and three- to five-year governments is
forty-three basis points, or a rise in the average rate of about sev-
enteen basis points per year. The differential in yields between
three- to five-year governments and twenty-year governments is
twenty-eight basis points. Hence the average rate for the segment
encompassed by these two maturities rises about one and three-
quarter basis points a year. Similar conclusions are implied by the
composite yield curve constructed from Durand's data 10(seeChart
2).
The Keynesian view, that the market prefers short- to long-term
securities to avoid the risks of capital losses, does not imply that
participants in this market need be characterized as risk avoiders
generally. An enterprise that is quite willing to speculate in what
it regards as its principal line of economic activity may rationally
be unwilling to run risks of capital losses on its holdings of money
substitutes. As long as it can speculate more efficiently in its prin-
cipal activities, there is no inconsistency between its risk aversion
in bond markets and risk acceptance or preference in other markets.
This argument is symmetrical for money holders. Some money is
held in preference to long- and short-term governments to avoid
risk. Yet it does not follow that money holders are generally risk
avoiders. To determine whether they are or not involves an over-all
term vis-à-vis those of short-termbonds is an economic, and not an arithmetic,
proposition which rests on the assumption that errors in forecasting future spot
rates are positively correlated. In principle, prices of long-term bonds could
fluctuate less than short-term bonds. To illustrate: Consider the price behavior
a one- and a two-year bond, assuming that. errors in forecasting the current
one-year rate are negatively correlated with errors in forecasting the one-year
rate one year hence. If long-term bonds did not fluctuate in price more than
short-term bonds, then Meiselman would not have observed that forecasting
errors and forecast revisions were positively correlated.
10Malkiel(ibid.,p.206) also concludes that, as term to maturity increases,
yield curves flatten out and the marginal vulnerability to interest rate changes
decreases.Why Liquidity Preference Exists 51
evaluation of their total risk positions. Knowledge of just money
holdings, or money substitute holdings, is not enough."
Acceptance of the Keynesian empirical judgment that the market
for governments is largely composed of risk avoiders does not neces-
sarily imply that short-term rates will be systematically lower than
long-term rates. It suggests that speculative opportunities will exist
for those who are willing to bear risks, i.e., those who are willing
to calculate on an expected value basis. More specifically, it suggests
that there ought to exist gains to be derived from being short on
near maturities and long on distant maturities.'2
Such a financing short is rarely undertaken. The going rate for
borrowing securities is one-half of 1 per cent. This is, in effect, a
call loan rate for governments. It can be terminated at the option
of either the supplier of securities on loan or the borrower. Secu-
rities on loan usually can be recalled on twenty-four hours notice.
Borrowers of securities must maintain collateral, in the form of
other governments, with the lenders of securities. The borrower
usually has the right to substitute from day to day among the se-
curities held as collateral, subject to the constraint that the aggre-
gate value of the collateral be equal to or greater than the secu-
rities borrowed.'3 The short seller must, when the lender wants
his securities back, either arrange for another loan or close out his
short position. In any case, he must reacquire the securities initially
borrowed through a new loan or by buying them in the market.
Since bills are held as money substitutes, the calling up of borrowed
bills by lenders during their term to maturity is to be expected.
Insofar as longer-term securities than bills are borrowed, the trans-
11 Similarly, the fact that a firm holds cash balances does not imply that it is a
creditor and is expecting deflation. Nor does the existence of bonds outstanding
for a firm imply that it is a net debtor. A more complex analysis of the entire
structure of monetary assets and monetary liabilities is necessary before such a
judgment can be reached.
12 It is important to recognize that this is not arbitrage. Changes in interest
rates will produce dramatic effects on the net equity position of a speculator in
such a position. A rise in rates implies capital losses, and a fall, capital gains.
13 This is one of the principal factors that make the loan rate as high as one-
half of 1 per cent. The lenders of securities, usually banks, incur clerical costs
as a result of frequent changes in the collateral offered by borrowers, typically
government bond dealers. Bond dealers usually offer the securities held in their
position as collateral.52 WhyLiquidity Preference Exists
actions costs for borrowing and reborrowing are reduced at the ex-
pense of higher rates of interest. Consequently, the short seller has
the choice of costs in the form of low interest rates (i.e., the yields
of very short maturities) with borrowing and reborrowing prob-
lems, or somewhat higher rates and somewhat more stable borrow-
ing arrangements.14
The costs of maintaining and financing a short position are usu-
ally so large that it is more economical for dealers to finance the
holding of long-term governments through bank loans or repur-
chase agreements. As a consequence, the yields of short-term secu-
rities are brought into line with long-term yields, not directly
through a short position in near-term maturities, but indirectly
through borrowing in the money market (i.e., a short position in
bank credit). For the suppliers of funds for the money market—
banks and nonfinancial institutions such as industrial enterprises—
providing credit to dealers is an alternative to holding bills. Con-
sequently, the bill rate is linked to. the cost of short-term dealer
financing through both the demand and the supply side of the
market. As a result of this interrelationship between the yield on
long-term governments on the one hand and financing costs of
dealers in the money market on the other, an equilibrium spread
exists between the yields of short- and long-term governments. In
equilibrium, the marginal costs of borrowing to finance the holding
of long-term governments should equal the yield spread between
bills and bonds. This spread measures the marginal costs of the
resources required for additional commitments in long-term secu-
rities financed by short-term liabilities.
Insofar as costs of speculating on the spreads between bills and
bonds exist, speculation will not operate to make the expected
value of bond yields the same as bill yields. Bonds will yield more
than bills and this differential will be a function •of the costs of
being short on near maturities and long on distant maturities. That
such positive costs exist is strongly supported by the empirical evi-
dence. Their existence implies that forward rates implicit in the
14 joint Economic Committee, Study of theDealer Market, p.59, reports that
the probability of a transaction in a government security is inversely related to
its term to maturity.Why Liquidity Preference Exists 53
term structure of interest rates, if one accepts the expectations hy-
pothesis, will be biased estimates of future short-term rates. The
interesting question is, how large are the costs of simultaneously
taking long positions on distant maturities and short positions on
near maturIties?
The government bond market does not exist in isolation. At the
short end it is an integral part of the money market, and at the
long end, of the capital market. A number of financial institutions
(in particular, commercial banks, the Federal Reserve System, sav-
ings banks, investment banks, savings and loan associations, life
insurance companies, government, municipal, and corporate bond
dealers, and the Federal National Mortgage Association), although
conventionally regarded as being extremely conservative, are specu-
lators in the money and capital markets. The average maturity of
their assets is greater than. the average maturity of their nonequity
liabilities. Hence, they are speculators in the sense that they are
long on long-term money and short on short-term money and by
and large, live on the carry. Their economic viability is a function
of the spread in yields between their assets and their liabilities.
Each of these classes of financial institutions operates in distinct
and overlapping portions of the money and capital markets. More-
over, the specifics of their modus operandi differ. Savings banks,
savings and loan associations, and life insurance companies issue
forms of time deposits to finance their acquisition of assets. Com-
mercial banks and the Federal Reserve Banks hold many short-term
assets, but they issue demand deposits. Dealers and investment bank-
ers bank loans and similar short-term credit instruments; life
insurance companies hold extremely long-term assets. These in-
stitutions all operate the same way in one essential respect—they
reduce the yields on long maturities and raise the yields on short ma-
turities. The existence of an average yield differential between bills
and bonds of about one hundred basis points over the three latest
reference cycles reflects the marginal costs of speculation to reduce
this yield differential. It emerges despite the work of all of these
financial institutions and reflects the fact that speculative activity,
like most economic activities, is not cost free.
This analysis suggests that there exists an equalizing difference54 WhyLiquidity Preference Exists
in yields between short- and long-term governments. This yield
differential measures, at the margin, the relative advantages of
short- long-term governments as money substitutes, i.e., as a
means of avoiding risks of interest rate changes and keeping down
transactions costs. It is analytically the same as the yield differential
between cash and long-term bonds that is often referred to as "the
rate of interest," but it is smaller because short-term governments
are less than perfect substitutes for cash balances.
The analysis also suggests that the spread between long- and
short-term governments need not be the same as the spread between
long- and short-term corporate bonds. Corporates have higher trans-
actions costs which limit the value of short-term corporates as
money substitutes. Hence, the corporate short-long spread ought to
be smaller than the corresponding yield spread for governments.
The usual brokerage charge for buying and selling a corporate
bond that is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and sells for
about $1,000 is $5.00, or one-half of 1 per cent. However, there is
some question as to whether the cost is comparable.. to the spread
between the bid and asked prices for governments. The latter in-
cludes the cost of the services of the dealer who takes a position,
whereas the former does not. A more relevant comparison is the
over-the-counter, one-hundred bond corporate market. Thisis
where most bonds are bought and sold. Dealers take positions and
have buying and selling prices comparable to the bid and asked
price for governments. For the bonds of A. T. & T., the corporate
security with the widest market, the most frequently found spread
isthree-quarters, or $7.50 per bond for long-term bonds. This
ranges down to about one-sixteenth for the very shortest-term
bonds.
These findings strongly support the Keynesian theory of "normal
backwardation" which rests on the premise that speculative services
on net balance come at a positive pecuniary cost to society. This
theory has common implications for commodity markets and the
markets for government securities.15 In commodity markets, the
15JohnM. Keynes, A Trealise on Money, Vol. II: The Applied Theory of
Money, London, 1930, pp. 142 if. This theory also appears in Hicks, Value and
Capital, pp. 136 if.Why Liquidity Preference Exists 55
theoryimplies that forward prices are biased and low estimates of
future spot prices; the prices of forward commitments rise as their
term to maturity shortens. Similarly, in the money and capital
markets, the theory implies that forward rates are biased and. high
estimates of spot rates; the prices of forward commitments rise as
their term to maturity shortens.
Normal backwardation views speculators as selling insurance
services to risk avoiders (or hedgers, in the case of commodity mar-
kets). This particular type of insurance, in common with insurance
generally, comes at a cost to society; the nonpecuniàry returns to
speculators as a class are not large enough to compensate them for
the opportunity costs of the resources used to provide their services.
In contrast to this view, Professor Knight and, subsequently, Pro-
fessor Telser enunciated the view that hedgers or risk avoiders pro-
vide the services of a casino to speculators.'° Futures markets, in
their view, are places where a speculator or gambler can get rela-
tively favorable betting odds, i.e., where the house take is :relatively
small. Consequently, they contend that forward prices could rep-
resent unbiased or even high estimates of the spot value of future
commitments. The nonpecuniary returns to speculators can be large
enough to compensate or more than compensate for the opportunity
costs of the resources employed in providing speculative services.
These views of futures markets imply that individuals choose
either to bear risks or to hire speculators to bear risks, at either
positive, zero, or negative cost. In fact the choice confronting the
holders of governments is either to bear risks' of capital losses or
risks of income instability, or some combination of both. Given the
stocks of long- and short-term securities that have been outstanding
during the period under investigation, society has on balance
chosen to bear the risks of income uncertainty and to hire specu-
lators at positive costs to bear the risks of capital uncertainty.'7
16FrankH. Knight, The Economic Organization, New York, 1951, p. 79; Lester
C. Telser, "Reply," Journal of Political Economy, August 1960, p. 406.
17.Althoughsociety has, on balance, paid for the service of bearing the risk of
capital losses, this does not imply that those who have provided this service have
been unable to hedge their risks. Insurance companies, because of the predicta-
bility of their expenditures, have been important suppliers of this service. Com-
monly, authors have referred to insurance company liabilities as long term. It is56 Why Liquidity Preference Exists
The costs of bearing the risks of income uncertainty appear to have
been negative. If "normal backwardation" is interpreted to mean
avoiding the risk of capital losses and not risk avoidance per Se,
then these findings support the Keynesian view.18
The existence of bias in the estimates of future short-term rates,
implied by the Lutz-Meiselman variant of the expectations hypoth-
esis, implies that securities of different terms to maturity are not
perfect substitutes for one another when the holding period yields
are equal. The existence of positive costs of arbitrage and specu-
lation is a necessary condition for the existence of liquidity pre-
miums. Whether there exists any yield relationship for which
securities of different maturities are perfect substitutes depends on
the character of cost conditions in the production of speculative
services.
The evidence presented suggests that the futures market for
money is in a sense segmented into many markets that are partly
isolated from one another through the existence of costs of con-
verting long- into short-term securities. This market, like that for
beer in the United States, is segmented by the existence of transpor-
tation costs.19
clear that these liabilities are not long term in the same sense that the issuer of
a long-term bond has a long-term liability. The cash surrender value of an
insurance policy is clearly a short.term liability, as are the rights to borrow
against cash surrender values. Similarly, death benefits may be regarded as con-
strained short-term liabilities.
18 The empirical evidence that has been brought to bear on the issue of bias
in forward rates in commodity markets has not been interpreted as providing
clear support for either the Knightian or Keynesian position. In large part, the
source of the difficulty has been that a very small bias in forward prices could
provide the going rate of return on capital to speculators. Yet the presence of
a small bias, particularly in a world in which prices have not been absolutely
stable, is very hard to detect. The relevant literature on this point includes
Lester G. Telser, "Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat,"
Journal of Political Economy, June 1958, p. 233; a subsequent exchange between
Cootner and Telser in the August 1960 issue of the same journal; and Holbrook
Working, "New Concepts Concerning Futures Markets and Prices," American
Economic Review, June 1962, pp. 449-454.
19 Specialists in the market for government securities are fond of arguing that
no one regards long- and short-term securities as perfect substitutes for one an-
other (presumably when holding period yields are alike), hence they are not
perfect substitutes in the market. Although this reasoning leaves something to
be desired, the conclusion appears to be valid.
A striking piece of evidence, already cited, that corroborates the views ofWhy Liquidity Preference Exists 57
Theintroduction of costs of converting long- into short-term
securities implies that, if the provision of speculative services in
this market is an increasing cost industry, the relative yields of
short- and long-term securities can be affected by the maturity com-
position of outstanding stocks. Hence, these yields can be influenced
by open market operations; whether or not the Fed (Federal Re-
serve System) follows a bills-only policy can make a difference. In-
sofar as the Fed buys bills, and bills only, the decrease in the stock
of bills outstanding implies an increase in the volume of specula-
tive services produced by financial intermediaries and hence a rise
in yield differentials. Conversely, insofar as the Fed buys only long-
term governments, the decrease in the stock of these securities out-
standing implies a decrease in the volume of speculative services
produced by financial intermediaries and hence a fall in yield
differentials. How large this fall or rise will be depends upon the
supply elasticity of speculative services.
Increasing costs of providing speculative services imply that
variations in the stocks of long- and short-term governments out-
standing will affect long-short yield differentials. This is a sufficient
but not a necessary condition for open market operations to affect
yield curves. The existence of constant costs for speculative services
implies that a specified range of yield differentials will exist; this
range will be analogous to gold points under a gold standard. De-
pending upon how wide the counterparts to gold points are, there
still remains some scope for open market operations as a means of
influencing the long-short yield differential. Probably the strongest
grounds for believing that increasing costs are relevant is the argu-
market practitioners is the term structure of bill yields during September 1960.
These observations showthat positivecosts of arbitrage irnistexist.Hence, by an
a fortiori argument, positive costs of providing speculative services must also
exist. Assuming that the market prefers to avoid risks of capital loss, these costs
imply a positively sloped yield curve. The rarely observed negative forward rates
were produced apparently by corporate treasurers who, to meet tax obligations
on December 15, mechanically bought Treasury bills that matured on December
15 in order to match tax expenditures with receipts.
The existence of these costs of arbitrage or speculation implies that forward
rates can vary from expected rates. Forward rates al-c usually higher than ex-
pected rates and the difference can be accounted 'for by risk avoidance and
speculative costs. Insofar as this is what is meant by market segmentation, the
position of specialists In the market is correct.58 Why Liquidity Preference Exists
ment that there exist variations among investors with respect to
their willingness to bear risk. Hence, as the volume of speculative
services produced increases, the costs of financial resources to specti-
lators will also increase.
A theoretical frame of reference similar to that enunciated in
this section seems to be implicit in the writings of many economists
in the field of debt management. For example, Simons believed
that short-term debt is a better money substitute than long-term
debt.2° This implies that there must be a pecuniary yield differ-
ential between long- and short-term debt since aggregate or total.
yield on both types of debt must be equal. Hence, a positively
sloped yield curve is implied.21 An advocate of a expectations
hypothesis would regard short- and long-term debt as having equal
inflationary potential; variations in the maturity distribution of
outstanding debt would have no effect on aggregate demand.
20See"On Debt Management," and "Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary
Policy," in Henry C. Sirnons, Economic Policy for a Free Society, Chicago, 1948.
21Siinons(ibid.. p. 225) recognizes this implication when he says, "...issue-
yields will normally vary directly with maturities."